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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issue to be decided is whether a number of houses
and fence lines were erroneously placed based on one or more
mistaken surveys, establish or become the basis for boundary by
acquiescence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Some of the statements made by appellants are not quite
accurate and therefore need to be stated correctly or amplified
in order to give this Court a proper understanding of the case.
The lawsuit brought by respondent Staker was not only
against the Ainsworths and the Holmes, but also against the
Yokums and the Shanes.

Because of some confusion in land

ownership, the Shanes were initially identified as John Does 1
and 2 but the property belonging to the Shanes was always the
subject of respondent Staker's lawsuit from the beginning.

A

separate action was begun by respondents Ainsworth against
appellant Maxfield.
The two cases were combined on the motion of
respondents Ainsworth in January of 1986.

The attempt was to

have all of the property boundary lines in the entire area
resolved at once and in one hearing.
1

Appellant Maxfield attended

the hearing on the motion to consolidate and even noticed up the
hearing himself.
The affidavits on file and the County Recorder's
records reflect that from the time of the original patent to the
present, the Holmes' property was held by parties different from
those who are in the chain of title to the Staker property.
at 74-75, 120-121.

R.

The records also reflect that physical

boundaries between the Staker and the Holmes' properties were set
at least at the turn of the century.

Id.

That is particularly

true of the home built initially on the Holmes' property and now
the residence of the Shanes.

Id.

Howeverr according to what now

appears to be a correct survey, the record property boundary runs
through the middle of the Shane house.

R. at 116-117.

Each of the parcels in question in this case have the
following consistent characteristics:
1.

All of the fence lines in question in these

combined cases (consisting of six separate east-west fences), are
each approximately the same distance from the record boundary
based on the current survey.
2.

The fence lines in question have been in existence

since the early 20's if not before.

See, e.g., R. at 74-75, 120-

121, 138-140, 190-192.
3.

There has been at least one survey of the

properties in question which was taken in the early 20's, which
survey now appear to be erroneous based on what appears to be the

2

use by that surveyors of an incorrect starting point,

R. at 163-

165.
4.

None of the parties to this action nor their

predesessors in interest have used any land beyond their fences.
See, e.g., R. at 138-140.
Up to the time of the sale to appellant Utah National
of the appellants' property in question, apparently everyone in
the general area treated the fence lines as the proper boundaries
between properties.

Upon appellant Utah National's purchase in

197 2 of their property in dispute, appellant Utah National had
the former owner quit claim to it that property between the fence
line on the south of appellants' property and the boundary line
according to a recent survey.

R. at 113-115.

That is the

property which the Ainsworths have claimed over the years because
it is within their fenced boundary*

See, e.g., R. at 93-94.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent Staker in his motion for summary judgment
asked the lower court for a determination that either the
surveyed boundary lines or the fence lines were the true
boundaries to his property, believing and arguing, however, that
the fence lines were the more appropriate boundary of the two.
Now that the lower court has found in favor of the fence lines,
respondent Staker believes that that decision should be supported
due not only to the long existence of the boundaries between
Staker and his neighbors on both the north and the south, but
3

also due to the pattern of fences which have been established
throughout this area as evidenced by the claims of other parties
to this litigation.

With that pattern existing due to at least

one, if not more, erroneous surveys performed many years ago when
surveying in rural areas was primitive at best, it now appears
that the burden is on appellants to establish that there is no
objective uncertainty by which the fence lines in question were
established.

Appellants have not only not met this burden, they

have not even attempted to meet this burden.

Therefore, the

judgment of the lower court should be sustained.

ARGUMENT
Despite the advice in Robert Frost's poem "Mending
Wall" that good fences make good neighbors, Frost also said,
"Something there is that doesn't love a wall."

In this case, out

of all of the parties to this action, only appellants do not love
a wall.

When appellants acquired their property, it is obvious

that they had had the benefit of a recent survey which reflected
that between the fence on the south of their parcel and the south
survey boundary line, there was a gap of some 75 feet.
None of the material facts behind that purchase were
before the lower court except for the fact that the parcel
appellants are claiming in this action was quit claimed to them.
The fact that there was a quit claim instead of a warranty deed
to that 75+ foot strip, however, tells the whole story.
Appellants knew that in order to secure the strip for their use,
4

there would have to be the kind of lawsuit in which the parties
are presently engaged.

But at no time have appellants actually

tried to use the strip of land which they are now claiming.
For the Ainsworths and Staker, if the current survey
line is to be the true boundary line, then they both pick up
property to the south while losing property on the north*

If the

fence lines are the true boundary, then the reverse is true.

In

either case, the total amount of their acreage remains almost
exactly the same.

Under the former scenario, the losers are the

Holmes', the Shanes' and the Yokums'.

The Holmes' and their

predesessors in interest have been using their land up to the
fence line for many years.

(R. at 118-121.)

The Shanes' house,

which they recently purchased from the Holmes, would be divided
in half by the survey boundary line.

For the Yokums, the shift

in the boundary line means they would totally lose their house.
(See diagram below).

If the fence lines are the boundary, the

only losers are the appellants who lose a strip of land they have
never used and to which they hold title by quit claim.

5
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This does not mean that this case should be decided
solely on the basis of equities, although on that basis there is
no question that the lower court was correct.

However, what it

does say is that this case is more than just a dispute between
appellants and the Ainsworths.

It calls for a readjustment of

large parcels of land and brings about a transfer of usage of
some 6 or 7 acres of land.

6

POINT I
THE ERRONEOUS SURVEYS CONSTITUTE THE OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY
There is no dispute that with the recent boundary by
acquiescence cases, (Halladav v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984);
Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984); Parsons v.
Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984)) this Court has redefined the
tests for determining if a particular fence line constitutes the
boundary between two parcels of ground.

In those series of

cases, this Court has indicated that there is a necessity of
establishing objective uncertainty which the fence line or other
visible marker was meant to resolve.

(Two of the cases, however,

did not actually turn on that issue.

In Halladav/ this Court

found that the parties claiming boundary by acquiescence actually
knew of the true boundaries during the period necessary for
acquiescence.

In Parsons, there was no showing that there was

mutual acquiescence for the requisite minimum of 20 years.)

The

obvious purpose of this test is to supply the legal substitute
for a written agreement between adjoining landowners that a fence
or other visible monument serves as the boundary between them.
This development in the law is to guard against a claim of
ownership based solely on the fact that one property owner does
not object for some time to his neighbor using his property.
This Court in its line of decisions has indicated that
a survey is the best measure by which a true boundary is to be
determined.

Thus in cities or well developed areas, it will be

difficult for anyone to claim land not actually covered by deed
7

or written agreement.

This changes, however, when the property

is located in a rural or farming area.
p. 501, Fn. 6.

See Halladav v. Cluff at

For farmland, adhering to established fence lines

might be the very best way of promoting "repose of title and
stability in boundaries."

Id. at 505.

Further, if the parties

relied on a survey which was in error, "that is a clear instance
of objective uncertainty."

Id. at 508, Fn. 7.

It is clear from Halladav that if owners of farm land
in fact build a fence based on a survey, that would be the very
best that they could do under the circumstances.

Their reliance

on a fence (even based on an incorrectly surveyed boundary line)
would in fact constitute the true boundary between the parties if
the parties accepted it as such for a long time.
what happened here.

That is exactly

There is no question, as shown from the

various affidavits, that the fences in question were set
according to one or more very early surveys and that said
survey(s) were erroneous.

There was thus no reasonable basis for

those who built houses and fenced farm lands in this area to deal
with this matter than other than as they did.
The fact that there now appears to be a correct survey
which cuts the Shanes' home in half and which totally precludes
the Yokums from using their house does not change what happened
before.

If, as appellants contend, fence lines established

pursuant to an erroneous survey and acknowledged for at least 50
years by the property owners on both sides to be the dividing
line between the properties do not establish the legal boundary,
8

it is submitted that virtually every rural fence in the State of
Utah is in doubt. A fence line in a rural area would always be
subject to the most recent survey, forcing property lines to
shift in accordance with a new survey.

That is particularly true

since there are many fences in the State of Utah which were
established by well-meaning surveyors who, because of their
primitive methods, were off on their surveys.
As a further anomaly, this Court has previously bound a
seller to a representation that it was selling all of the land
within two fence lines, even though the precise legal description
found in the written contract did not include all of that land.
Nevertheless, this Court required the seller to perform based on
fence lines and not on the legal description.

See Jensen v.

Manila Corporation, 565 P.2d 63 (Utah 1977).

POINT II
THE APPEAL IS OF THE ENTIRE DECISION OF THE COURT
Appellants have tried to make the claim that their only
argument is with respondents Ainsworth and that they have no
dispute with the remainder of the parties.
of appeal does not make that limitation.

However, their notice

It appeals the entire

decision made below.
As can be seen from the Record at pages 252-253,
respondent Staker has taken the position that either the fence
line or the survey boundary lines should prevail, but that there
should be consistency in the court's decision.
9

The court below

found for the fence lines and Staker agreed with that position as
being the better result.

If this Court, however, were to find

for appellants, then respondents Ainsworth would have the right
to ask that that same ruling apply to their southern boundary
which would then take some 75 feet from respondent Staker's
property.

Staker would then in turn have the right to ask the

same from respondents Jensen, Shane and Yokum.
As was clearly enunciated in a recent decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals, which interestingly enough, was a followon case to the Halladay v. Cluff case decided by this Court, that
court affirmed the position that a party satisfied with the
results of the district court need not cross appeal.
cross-appeal would not have been appropriate."
Cluff, 739 P. 2d 643, 645 (Utah App. 1987).

In fact "a

Halladay v.

To so cross-appeal

would be to take a position inconsistent with the position with
which the party agreed.

It would only be if this Court reverses

the lower court decision that respondents have any need for
taking further action.
Thus, it is clear that the appellants by their action
are in fact seeking to overturn the decision of the lower court
with regard to all of the fence lines involved in the lower
court's decision.

Hence any decision with regard to the boundary

lines would be applicable to all parcels.

10

POINT III
THE CONSISTENCY OF THE FENCE LINE SHOWS THAT THEY WERE PLACED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH A SURVEY.
Appellant suggests that the reason why fences were
placed where they were is uncertain and unknown.

However,

contrary to that argument are the following uncontroverted facts:
1.

The Holmes and their predecessors in interest have

always regarded the fence line on their northern boundary to be
their property boundary.
2.

R. at 73-74, 118-121.

The Holmes' property has never been held by holders

of the title to Staker's property at any time and vice versa.
3.

Each of the fences in question is approximately the

same distance away from the current survey line, or in other
words, around 75 feet.
4.
the fences.

See the diagram on p.8 of this Brief.

There are survey markers in line with certain of
R. at 195.

The foregoing suggests that the property owners in this
rural area established their fence lines precisely on those
boundaries that they thought separated each other's property.
The fact that each one of them is consistent with the other in
distance away from what is now being termed the correct survey
line shows that there is indeed a definite pattern supporting the
basis as to the placement of the fences in accordance with one or
more earlier surveys.

Naturally enough, the remoteness in time

of the occurrence of the placement of the fences makes it
difficult for any party to give exact information as to why the
11

fences were established where they now stand.

However,

respondent Staker submits that this is another basis for
believing that this enormous length of time of acceptance of the
fence line adds credence to the claim.

The properties have

traded hands over the years and there has been no thought other
than that the fence lines were the boundary throughout.

POINT IV
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON APPELLANTS
The Halladav case suggests (contrary to appellants'
contention) that the burden of proof is on appellants in this
case.

Certainly that decision makes clear that the burden of

proof enunciated in that case was specifically limited to that
case and to those facts.
(Utah 1984).

Halladav v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500, 507

This Court's decision in Halladav strongly suggests

that the burden of proof in the instant case is allocated to
appellants because of the overwhelming pattern of fences in
relation to present survey lines in the whole area.
one isolated case of a dispute between two neighbors.

It is not
Therefore,

appellants should have the burden of proof of showing that there
was no objective uncertainty.

And they have not met that burden.

Certainly, the history of the early settlers of this
State should suffice to note that if a man did not own a piece of
property, and particularly 75 feet or so of it some 1,000 feet
long, he did not fence it in and use it. Moreover, it is also
well known that canals and ditches were constructed along
12

boundaries and often themselves constituted the boundary between
parties as opposed to a fence.

Therefore, considering the record

ownership of the properties under the circumstances, it is more
natural to assume that the construction of ditches and canals
came after the establishment of fences as the boundary.
According to appellants7 theory, there is no such thing
as an incorrect survey on which one could base objective
uncertainty because one can always have a correct survey.

There

is no question, for example, that the monument at the corner of
South Temple and Main Street in Salt Lake City, which establishes
the beginning point for all surveys in the state was in existence
in 1856.

R. at 164. Therefore, according to the appellants'

argument, one could easily begin a survey from that Base and
Meridian and survey correctly the land in question, even though
it is located some 100 blocks south of that monument.

But of

course, that argument is not supported by any of the cases. Nor
does even the fact that a good surveyor with modern equipment
could have made a correct survey of the property in question from
even a closer monument.

The test, repeated over and over again

in Halladay, is a "reasonably available" survey.

The most

reasonably available survey which anyone can name prior to the
recent past is that of Mr. Rock, and that survey appears to have
been wrong.

R. at 163-165, 194.

13

POINT V
THERE IS NO MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT WHICH REQUIRES FURTHER TRIAL
At the beginning of the hearing, the court asked the
parties to declare by the end of the hearing whether there
remained any factual disputes.

(R. at 240.)

Then after all the

arguments had concluded, the court asked the parties to submit
all additional matters by way of affidavit. (R. at 313-314, 319.)
In response, some parties filed additional affidavits, namely one
was filed on behalf of appellants and one was filed on behalf of
respondents Ainsworth.

With those additions, there is every

indication from the parties that all materials necessary to
decide this case were before the court.
stated specifically:

In fact, the court

"[W]hat I gleam from you gentlemen*... is

that there is no more factual matters and you want me to rule on
it as a matter of law."

R. at 319.

It is interesting that appellants should complain of
materials submitted by affidavit from the respondents and yet, as
part of their argument, rely on the affidavit of appellant
Maxfield for the truthfulness of what one of the surveyors whose
affidavit is before the court allegedly told Mr. Maxfield in a
private conversation with no other parties present.

R. at 169.

Appellants do not present that supposed contradictory statement
by way of affidavit from the surveyor himself and certainly the
surveyor is no party to this action.

Therefore, this Court can

rightfully reject such portions of the various affidavits as is

14

appropriate, such as that extremely heresay material from
Maxfield.
Taking only those portions of the various affidavits
which are proper for the purposes of summary judgment, however,
there still are really no material factual issues in this case.
For the purpose of ordering summary judgment in favor of the
fence lines as the boundaries between the various parcels, the
lower court had all it needed.

What more would a trial of the

issues bring to bear on the subject?

Certainly, it is doubtful

that there could be any better information concerning exactly the
methods and practices of Mr. Rock, the surveyor in the 1920's.
Although not so stated, it appears that Mr. Rock is deceased.
Certainly no one can seem to give any indication of his
whereabouts.

Nor are his records apparently extant (which is in

keeping with his reputation of not being a very careful
surveyor).

R. at 165, 194.
It should be further apparent that there are no living

witnesses to indicate the basis upon which either the Shane home
or the Yokum home were built except to repeat the statements
found in the affidavit of Melvin Lancaster, Teeples and others
that everyone treated the fences as the boundaries.

R. at 74-75,

118-121, 138-140. The fact that the home now occupied by the
Shanes' appears to have been built prior to the Rock survey in
the 1920 's does not by itself elicit any testimony as to the
exact basis upon which the home was built, i.e., why it was built
on what appellants claim to be the property line.
15

However, there

is no indication that there is any extant testimony that would
better explain that matter.
In short, it is the nature of these kinds of cases that
there is, in fact, many aspects of testimony which are missing
and which have led the courts to adopt the theory of boundary by
acquiescence to substitute, legally, for matters which cannot be
determined, one way or another, out of the past.

In fact, one of

the major prerequisites for boundary by acquiescence is that the
boundaries have existed for a long time.

Thus, there is no basis

for this Court to return this case for trial since there is no
indication that at a trial of this matter any further critical
and material facts would be established.

POINT VI
THIS COURT HAS NOT ABANDONED BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
A recent law review article seems to imply that this
Court has totally abandoned boundary by acquiescence and has done
so by reason of confusion between the requirements for boundary
by contract and boundary by acquiescence.

See Backman, ''The Law

of Practical Location of Boundaries and the* Need for an Adverse
Possession Remedy" 1986 BYU Law Review 957,966.
Howe has expressed that concern.
360, 366 (Utah 1984).

Even Justice

Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d

But despite that concern, there is basis

left for the courts to find boundary by acquiescence and this is
such a case.

However, if appellants are right, then perhaps

Justice Howe is correct that "the death knell" has sounded.

16

Id.

CONCLUSION
This Court in numerous decisions as well as other
courts and other jurisdictions faced with the same problem have
constantly held it to be a significant goal in the law to avoid
litigation relating to boundaries and to encourage neighbors to
be neighborly.

The fence lines in this particular case

have been long respected by the various neighbors as being the
boundary lines.

Even when surveys in 1956 and again in the

1970 's revealed differences between the legal description and the
fence lines, no one bothered to contest the placement of the
fences.

Even respondent Staker, in initiating this action, did

not elect to have his boundary set according to the survey line.
Rather, the suit was started in the alternative with the
preference stated in favor of the fences.

On the other hand,

when appellants acquired their land and learned that there was
some 75 feet beyond their fence line which might conceivably be
available to them, they acquired a quit claim deed to that strip.
They then simply waited for the day when they could claim that
strip even though during that entire period of time, they never
used it or attempted to use it.

It is submitted that the

doctorine of boundary by acquiescence is not dead.

Even applying

the strongest language found in Halladay and the follow-on cases,
there still exists boundary by acquiescence in this case. The
lower court decision should be sustained.
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